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Book Review
Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post, Forthe Common Good: Principles ofAmerican
Academic Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 272, $27.50.
Reviewed by David S. Tanenhaus
I used to think that the brain was the most wonderful organ in the body.
But then I thought, who's telling me this.'
Thinking seriously about academic freedom, including reading Matthew
W. Finkin's and Robert C. Post's provocative For the Common Good: Principles of
American Academic Freedom, is an existential experience. As they note, "Academic
freedom, if it is to do the hard work of protecting faculty from the waves of
repression that periodically sweep through the American polity, must explain
why scholars ought to enjoy freedoms that other members of the public do not
possess" (44). They argue that academics should not make an individual rights-
based claim to justify this additional freedom. Instead, they demonstrate that
the benefits and responsibilities of academic freedom derive from membership
in a professional community of scholars committed to the cultivation and
dissemination of knowledge. "Academic freedom," they stress, "is not the
freedom to speak or to teach just as one wishes. Rather, it is the freedom to
pursue the scholarly profession, inside and outside the classroom, according
to the norms and standards of that profession" (49). Rather than being free to
be you and me, we're free to be us. But who are we?
Finkin and Post turn to history, not constitutional law, to answer this
question of professional identity. Emphasizing that "we address professional
understandings of academic freedom, rather than the constitutional law of academic
freedom," (9) they survey the origins of the concept of academic freedom, the
creation of a foundational text (i.e., the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic
Freedom andAcademic Tenure), and its later codification and explication. Separate
chapters then analyze the four domains of modern academic freedom:
protecting freedom of speech and publication, freedom in the classroom,
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freedom of intramural speech (i.e., faculty speech about his or her institution's
practices), and freedom of extramural speech (i.e., a faculty member speaking
in his or her capacity as a citizen). This slim volume is essential reading.
Finkin and Post provide an exceptionally American answer to the question
of who we are. After tracing the origins of the concept of academic freedom
from the suppression of ideas in the book of Exodus to the crystallization of the
German ideal of akademischeFreiheitin the 18 th and 19 ,h centuries, they demonstrate
why this German concept could not be transplanted in American institutional
soil. The German ideal, which "combined autonomy for the university as a
self-governing body and freedom of teaching and learning," assumed that
professors were highly esteemed civil servants entrusted to cultivate knowledge
(22). Their American counterparts did not share this exalted status. They were
considered employees of institutions, most of which were governed by boards
of trustees. This meant that non-scholars, in many instances, could determine
"what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be
published" (24-25). The American scholar, especially one who challenged the
tenets of laissez-faire capitalism in the Gilded Age, risked unemployment.
The ensuing struggle to redefine the place of the scholar in the United
States led to the American Association of University Professors' 1915
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. Drafted primarily
by economist Edwin R. A. Seligman and philosopher Arthur 0. Lovejoy, this
document served "as the first systematic articulation of the logic and structure
of academic freedom in America" (3o). A Progressive Era paean to expertise,
science, and the organic nature of modern civilization, the declaration asserted
that scholars, by creating the knowledge necessary for progress and social
betterment, worked for the public good. To do this vital work properly, they
required more protections in the workplace than a factory worker or even the
president of a university. Significantly (and ironically in light of early 2 0 th
century campaigns to rein in the power of judges), the declaration argued
that scholars should be treated like federal judges. Once appointed, a scholar
should have freedom of thought and utterance. Just as a federal judge worked
in a judicial system and followed specific rules, the scholar, too, was part of a
system with norms. It was the responsibility of academics, as the declaration
contended, to police the necessary conditions to produce knowledge.
It is worth noting how comfortably this declaration of principles fit with
early 2 oh century American conceptions of citizenship. As Christopher
Capozzola has argued, "In the years before the [First World War], voluntary
associations-clubs, schools, churches, parties, unions-organized much of
American public life. Such groups provided social services, regulated the
economy, policed crime, and managed community norms. Schooled in this
world of civic voluntarism, Americans formed their social bonds-and their
political obligations-first to each other and then to the state. Indeed, in the
absence of formal federal institutions, these voluntary associations sometimes
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acted as the state." Americans of this era, including academics, structured
their lives around collective undertakings. This included a strong belief in the
obligation of responsible speech, especially during perilous times. Thus, the
core components of academic freedom in the United States took root before
the later creation of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
Many of the core principles from this Progressive Era declaration were later
codified in the 1940 Statement ofPrinaples ofAcademic Freedom and Tenure, which more
than 2oo organizations now endorse, and which has helped to nationalize
standards and practices in the United States. Today, a scholar who moves from
a small college to a large university can expect his or her new institutional
home to have a familiar commitment to academic freedom,
The problem, according to Finkin and Post, is that "American principles
of academic freedom have become a victim of their own success" (5). We no
longer debate whether academic freedom should exist, but instead treat these
principles as "a 'folkway,' a warm and vaguely fuzzy privilege assumed by
faculty as a 'God-given right' without careful attention to its hard requirements
and logical implications"(6). Moreover, many academics either assume or
believe that academic freedom has always been or should be an individual right
rooted in the First Amendment. Finkin and Post argue that this individualistic
rationale for academic freedom would undermine public support and destroy
the socially constructed and legally enforced conditions necessary to produce
knowledge. Consequently, they ask their fellow academics to reject this
dangerous path and instead revisit the foundational principles of American
academic freedom.
This splendid book is much more than a careful parsing and celebration
of a canonical text from the Progressive Era. It also introduces the reader
to the decisions of Committee A of the American Association of University
Professors. Since 1915, this committee has been investigating and reporting
its findings on alleged violations of academic freedom. After the adoption of
the 1940 Statement, Committee A has been responsible for interpreting its
meaning. "As the reasoned conclusions of an especially knowledgeable body,
the opinions of Committee A offer an usually rich resource for understanding
the meaning of academic freedom in America" (51). "These decisions," Finkin
and Post argue, "provide a rich and useful common law of academic freedom"
(6). Although these decisions do not bind judges or university administrators,
they argue that academics should treat them as valuable precedents. Thus,
almost a century after American academics compared themselves to federal
judges, now academic lawyers are leading the campaign to educate their fellow
scholars about academic freedom. This development alone speaks volumes
about the place of the law school in the research university.
Freedom of research and publication, according to Finkin and Post,
demonstrate the success of the idea of academic freedom as well as its gravest
threat. Although there is public support for freedom of inquiry and speculation
2. Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the
Modern American Citizen 7 (Oxford University Press 2oo 8).
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as essential ingredients in the process of creating new knowledge, they fear
that a culture of antinomianism encourages faculty to think about academic
freedom as an individual right instead of a collective right of professional
exploration. Embracing an individual rights defense, they argue, would
needlessly jettison a tried and true defense of academic freedom against public
regulation. As they explain:
The external defense of academic freedom will collapse if faculty lose faith
in the professional norms necessary to define and generate knowledge. The
traditional ideal of freedom of research and publication can be sustained
only if those who exercise the prerogative of peer review interpret disciplinary
standards in a manner that maintains the internal legitimacy of these standards.
The interpretation of these norms will thus predictably and appropriately
be influenced by the need to preserve sufficient social cohesion within the
profession to sustain the authority of these norms. As a practical matter,
successful institutions of peer review will therefore maintain a sensible and
wise equilibrium between innovation and stability. The ultimate constraint,
however, is whether peer reviewers apply disciplinary norms that over time
produce credible forms of knowledge (6o-6i).
This is a powerful and pragmatic argument about the importance of
professional standards to maintain the integrity of knowledge production. It
also reflects academic life in the modern law school, in which many faculty
members now publish in peer-reviewed journals and many also hold Ph.D.'s
in other disciplines.
It is also fascinating to see academic lawyers discuss undergraduate
teaching, including the selection of topics, calls for more political balance in
the classroom, and concerns about creating hostile teaching environments.
Since their method uses the investigations of Committee A to shed light on
fundamental principles, their findings remind us that the past is a prolonged
and often painful prologue. The overall lesson is simple: "Academic freedom
obligates scholars to use disciplinary standards, not political standards, to
guide their teaching" (0o4). Yet, the academic socialization of students can be
a brutal business. For example, they declare, "Faculty must respect students as
persons, but they needn't respect ideas, even ideas held by students. In higher
education no idea is immune from potentially scathing criticism. If a student
identifies with his own ideas, he might well experience ruthless critique of
these ideas as a personal assault. But it is precisely the pedagogical purpose
of higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their
own ideas" (105). There are, of course, different pedagogical approaches to
teaching an introductory undergraduate course and torts. And differences
between a law student and a freshman!
Intramural and extramural expressions constitute the final two domains of
academic freedom. The former focuses on a faculty member discussing his
or her institution's policy, but does not involve disciplinary expertise. This
freedom allows for academics to participate actively in the governance of
HeinOnline  -- 59 J. Legal Educ. 479 2009-2010
Journal of Legal Education
their institutions and is the cornerstone of the ideal of faculty governance. It
is also the shortest and most straightforward chapter in For the Common Good.
Finkin and Post tell the story of the concept's emergence, crystallization, and
culmination in the 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities.
The freedom of extramural expression, as Finkin and Post acknowledge,
is "the most theoretically problematic aspect of academic freedom" (127).
"Why should faculties," they ask, "be free to speak in public in ways that
damage their institutions, even if such speech is by hypothesis unprotected
by freedom of research or intramural expression?" (31) To cite a personal
example, I appeared on The O'Reilly Factor in the fall of 2oo8 to explain why I
signed a petition in support of William Ayers.3 Teaching at a public university
in a state that was a battleground during the presidential election with many
strong feelings on both sides, I knew that my appearance might anger some.
According to the 1915 and 194o Declarations, I should have been cautious before
making such an appearance. Both declarations approached extramural speech
from the perspective of the responsible speech tradition. For instance, the 1940
Declaration announced:
College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession,
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens,
they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their
special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars
and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge
their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show
respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate
that they are not speaking for the institution (quoted on 131 ) .
It was not until 1970 that the American Association of University Professors
and the Association of American Colleges revised this language. It now reads:
"The controlling principle is that a faculty member's expression of opinion as
a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates
the faculty member's unfitness for his or her position. Extramural utterances
rarely bear upon the faculty members' fitness for the position" (131). Judging
from the e-mails that I received, some people believed that anyone defending
Ayers was categorically unfit to teach. I should note that former University of
Nevada, Las Vegas President David Ashley called me to offer his full support.
At the time that I defended Ayers on academic freedom grounds, I did
not consider carefully why I had the freedom to speak extramurally. Like
many of the intended readers of For the Common Good, I assumed that it was a
First Amendment right. As it turns out, it was a good thing, institutionally
speaking, that I didn't have to worry about participating in a heated story
during a national election. Over time, it turns out Committee A has repeatedly
3. William Ayers, Distinguished Professor of Education and Senior University Scholar at the
University of Illinois at Chicago, had been a leader of the radical anti-Vietnam War group,
the Weather Underground.
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emphasized that punishing faculty for their extramural speech can create a
climate in which academics cannot perform their essential tasks. They worry
too much about what they should or should not say. The solution, from the
perspective of Committee A, is to allow only faculty, not public constituencies,
to determine questions of professional competence.
I think that my own experience attests to the value of reading this
sophisticated book. As academics, we should be able to articulate why we
have additional freedoms. But we also want to work at institutions where we
don't have to exercise our right to intramural speech to protect our extramural
utterances. Yet, this is a book by academics for academics. It may help to protect
academic freedom from internal threats, but as the history of Committee A
suggests, there will always be another, external battle.
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